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Coincidence (e.g., of a statue and the piece of bronze which constitutes it) comes in
two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism (about coincidence) is
the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails
identity. Extreme monism (also known as the stage theory) is the position that even
temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court.1
The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position (= my own position) is moderate
monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.
In what follows I first outline the moderate monism position and compare and
contrast it with other metaphysical positions with which it is often associated. I then
outline the arguments for moderate monism that seem to me most persuasive, drawing
on earlier work of my own (1993) and Mark Johnston’s (1992). Next I turn to three
criticisms of moderate monism, by Jim Stone (2005a, 2005c), Eric Olson (2006) and
Penelope Mackie (unpublished). In responding to these criticisms I maintain (a) that
sortal concepts satisfy de dicto modal principles that constrain the histories of the
things falling under them and that may be thought of as specifying the criteria of
identity for the things falling under the sortal concepts, (b) that a distinction is
required between restricted sortal quantification and unrestricted quantification over
the things falling under a sortal concept (between e.g., ‘some statue is …’ and
‘something is a statue and is …’) and (c) that reflecting on the arguments which
enforce this distinction provides the best ground for accepting that ‘identity is
relative’ in one sense familiar from the writings of Peter Geach (1980), namely that
1 The terminology comes from Fine (2003), with some modifications.
2identity under a sortal concept at a time (expressible in the form ‘is the same S as at
t’) does not entail absolute, Leibnizian identity. I shall suggest that one way (not the
only way) of combining these ideas is to defend a variant of stage theory which is a
sort of synthesis of some of the ideas of Hawley (2001) and Sider (2001), but is not so
great a departure from standard perdurantism and which yields a variant on moderate
monism – which may be thought of as moderately extreme monism.
I
I begin by outlining the moderate monist position.
According to the moderate monist if God creates ex nihilo (at t1) a bronze
statue and later (at t10) annihilates it, destroying both the statue and the bronze of
which it is composed (so we have a case of permanent coincidence – Scenario I), the
statue and the piece of bronze are identical. If, however, God simply radically
reshapes the bronze at t10 (so that we have a case of same origin, temporary
coincidence – Scenario II), the statue ceases to exist and the piece of bronze survives,
so despite their coincidence up to t10 the statue and the piece of bronze are two
things.
Since it is true to say that the statue in Scenario I could not have been radically
reshaped without being destroyed, but the piece of bronze in Scenario I could have
been radically reshaped without being destroyed, to conform to Leibniz’s Law the
moderate monist must accept that modal predication is what I have elsewhere called
‘Abelardian’ (Noonan 1991), so that the reference of, e.g., ‘could have been radically
reshaped without being destroyed’ is different when attached to ‘the statue’ and ‘the
piece of bronze’. One way of fleshing this out is to give a Lewisean counterpart-
theoretic account of modal predication, according to which ‘could have been radically
reshaped without being destroyed’ stands for the property has a statue counterpart
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for the property has a piece of bronze counterpart which is radically reshaped but not
destroyed when attached to ‘the piece of bronze’. However, acceptance of the
Abelardian character of modal predication, which is obligatory for the moderate
monist (and the extreme monist) – unless, of course, he endorses a comprehensive
Quinean scepticism about any grade of modal involvement beyond modality de dicto
– does not require acceptance of Lewisean counterpart theory, or a fortiori, of
Lewisean modal realism.
Another position with which the moderate monist need not associate himself is
perdurantism. In fact, there is a two-way logical independence. A moderate monist is
not logically required to be a perdurantism (and might very reasonably not be) and a
perdurantist might, with logical consistency, embrace pluralism (though this position
would, I think, be rather perverse).
To see the lack of necessary connection either way between moderate monism
and perdurantism, or four-dimensionalism, reflect on the commitments of the latter
position.
The first, and most strongly emphasized in the literature, is what John
Hawthorne (2006) refers to as the doctrine of plenitude: every persisting object has an
infinite number of temporal parts, at least one for each non-zero temporal interval in
its history.2 The perdurantist may embrace what Hawthorne calls ‘instantaneous
2 I follow Hawthorne and Sider (2001) in my understanding of the notion of a
temporal part. X is a temporal part of y at t if and only if x coincides with y at t and x
exists only at t. Coincidence is explained in terms of overlap. One thing coincides
with another at a time just in case the first overlaps everything that is a part of the
second at the time (so it is big enough) and the second overlaps everything that is part
of the first at the time (so it is not too big). One thing overlaps a second at a time iff
they share a part at the time. One thing is a temporal part of another iff it is a temporal
part of it at some time. So I am a temporal part of myself. And if a piece of bronze is
4plenitude’ and insist that every persisting object has a temporal part for each instant of
its existence, or he may insist only on what Hawthorne calls ‘gunky plenitude’ and be
non-committal about instantaneous temporal parts. Either way, his ontology contains
a great many things that are not parts of the standard, three-dimensional, pluralist
position.
The perdurantist may also accept, and frequently does, the doctrine of
‘universalism’, that every aggregrate of temporal parts is an object whether or not the
aggregates are aggregates of parts from what we would commonsensically think of as
the histories of a single object.
Putting these theses together the typical perdurantist accepts that there is such
a thing as Noonan-from-1960-to-1980, such a thing as Noonan-from-1960-1980 plus
Noonan-from 1990-2000, Noonan-right-now, the first half of Cleopatra plus the
second half of Winston Churchill and so on.
The typical perdurantist also appeals to his ontology to deal with Lewis’s
problem of temporary intrinsics (which, of course, Lewis put forward as an argument
for perdurantism). If I am bent on Monday but straight on Tuesday I stand in the bent
on (or at) relation to Monday and the straight at relation to Tuesday. According to the
standard three-dimensionalist position that is all that can be said. But the perdurantist
can say more. He can say that I am bent on Monday because my Monday temporal
part possesses the property of being bent. The three-dimensionalist cannot say this
because he does not recognise the existence of my Monday temporal part. So the
three-dimensionalist has to accept that the state of affairs of my being bent on
made into a statue, which is subsequently destroyed without repair or replacement of
parts, the statue is uncontroversially a temporal part of the piece of bronze. Given this
definition, then, the difference between the endurantist or three-dimensionalist and the
perdurantist cannot just be that the latter accepts the existence of temporal parts.
5Monday is irreducibly relational. On the other hand, the perdurantist can
accommodate Lewis’s intuition that shapes are fundamentally non-relational
properties and that persisting things stand in such relations as the bent at relation to
times in virtue of their temporal parts possessing fundamental non-relational
properties.
Of course, the perdurantist does not have to accept the Lewisean intuition of
the fundamentality of the non-relational (or more precisely, of the non-time-indexed,
since it is not relations as such Lewis thinks should not be regarded as fundamental,
but relations to times) and is not committed to doing so by his acceptance of a
plenitudinous ontology. All the perdurantist is committed to accepting is that, if I am
bent on Monday, I coincide with something, my Monday temporal part, which has the
property of coinciding with something which is bent on Monday. He does not have to
accept that the temporal part is bent on Monday; much less that it is bent simpliciter.
(To see why the perdurantist might wish to reject the Lewisean intuition of the
fundamentality of the non-time-indexed, consider the property of being conscious on
Monday. Should we say that if I possess it this is in virtue of the fact that something
else (a temporal part of me) is conscious on Monday, or is conscious simpliciter?)
So much, for the time being, for perdurantism. I have been stressing that it is
package deal and the elements of the package are logically separable. However, the
minimal perdurantist commitment is to gunky plenitude, and so to an ontology
significantly more extensive than that of common sense, and now it should be clear
that the moderate monist has no such evident commitment. The moderate monist’s
motivation is repugnance at the inflated ontology of the pluralist, which in itself can
hardly incline him to endorse the perdurantist’s plenitudinous ontology (it is another
question, of course, whether there are arguments he, along with everyone else, should
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plenitude of temporal parts in order to appeal to the Abelardian character of modal
predicaton to resist the pluralist’s argument from Leibniz’s Law. The two are clearly
separable (even though they are both embraced by Lewis).
Moderate monist need not be perdurantists, then, unless everyone needs to be
a perdurantist. Equally, perdurantists need not be moderate monists. A perdurantist
can accept that, whenever I exist, there is something coincident with me that exists
only at that time, without regarding me as a mere aggregate of such temporal parts. Or
he can say that the temporal parts of the statue and the permanently coincident piece
of bronze are distinct – in virtue perhaps of modal differences between them, so the
statue-at-t5 and the piece-of-bronze-at-t5 are distinct instantaneous objects that
(permanently) coincide. Insofar as the perdurantist wants to emphasise analogies
between time and space he should not take this line, since it is like saying that when
two houses share a wall there are actually two spatially coincident walls, but again my
point is just that it is logically consistent to be a perdurantist (in the minimal sense)
and simultaneously a pluralist.
II
The argument for moderate monism should not then be that it is a consequence of
perdurantism, since it is not (quite apart from the fact that this argument would beg
the question why perdurantism should be accepted). So what arguments are there for
moderate monism?
Of course, moderate monism is a conjunctive thesis: that permanent
coincidence is, but temporary coincidence is not, identity. So arguments for it have to
rule out both the opposing positions, both pluralism and extreme monism. But in this
section I will focus just on arguments against pluralism and defer discussion of
7extreme monism until later (though I have already indicated that I am in fact a good
deal less unfriendly to it than to pluralism).
The fundamental anti-pluralist intuition is an intuition of supervenience: there
cannot be two purely material objects which in all actual, relational and non-
relational, past, present and future respects are microphysically indistinguishable – as
the statue and the piece of bronze are in the permanent coincidence situation if they
are not identical. But this is precisely what the pluralist denies, so how can we get
beyond the clash of intuitions?
I think that there are two main lines of argument against pluralism.
The first is as follows. While it may be disputable whether the statue and the
piece of clay in the permanent coincidence situation – call them, as usual, Goliath and
Lumpl – are distinct objects, no one could accept that they are distinct statues. The
pluralist has to say that despite the properties it shares with Goliath, Lumpl is not a
statue, and despite the properties it shares with Lumpl, Goliath is not a piece of bronze
(alternatively the pluralist can say that though Goliath and Lumpl are both statues and
distinct objects they are not distinct statues, but no pluralist will say that). So the
pluralist has got to reject any proposition that entails that Lumpl is a statue (and any
proposition that entails that Goliath is a piece of bronze).
But consider the following proposition (adapted from Johnston 1992, see also
Noonan 1993; I follow Johnston’s numbering):
(8) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y then x is a
statue.
Suppose now, for reductio, that Goliath and Lumpl are distinct. Goliath is a paradigm
statue, and Lumpl is microphysically indistinguishable from Goliath, so, given (8),
Lumpl is a statue. Hence there must be not merely two coincident material objects
8where Goliath is, but two coincident statues. But this is intolerable, hence, given (8),
Goliath and Lumpl cannot be distinct.
Although Johnston thinks that this is an impressive argument against
pluralism, he thinks that it can be resisted, since it can be seen that (8) is false. (8) is
false because if it were true the following would also be true:
(9) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect
relevant to being a statue only very minutely, then x is a statue.
But that (9) is false, Johnston argues, can be seen by considering Peter Unger's (1981)
‘problem of the many’.
The problem of the many begins from the observation that:
(10) In the closest vicinity of any paradigm middle-sized material F there are
usually very many entities that differ only minimally from the paradigm in any
respect.
Applying this principle to the case of Goliath/Lumpl, given (9) we must conclude that
in the vicinity of Goliath there must be many statues, albeit highly coincident, almost
completely overlapping. But this is false, hence, Johnston argues, the problem of the
many reveals that (9) and hence (8) must be rejected.
Johnston thinks that what should replace (8) and (9) are:
(8’) If y is a paradigm statue and x is intrinsically exactly like y and x is of the
right category, i.e. not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue
and:
(9’) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any
respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x is of the right
category, i.e. is not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue.
9I have doubts about whether these replacements provide a solution to the problem of
the many, as Johnston thinks, but whether or not this is so, it is clear that the
following alternative weakenings of (8) and (9) are not cast into doubt by that
problem:
(8*) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y and x
does not merely partly overlap any statue then x is a statue.
(9*) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any
respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x does not merely
partly overlap any statue then x is a statue.
But if (8*) is true Lumpl is a statue just as Goliath is.
And, of course, if (8*) and (9*) are acceptable so are:
(8*’) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y and x
does not merely partly overlap any statue and x is of the right category, i.e.,
not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue,
and:
(9*’) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any
respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x does not merely
partly overlap any statue and x is of the right category, i.e., not a mere quantity
or piece of matter, then x is a statue.
Of course, (8*’) does not entail that Lumpl is a statue, but as we shall see later it can
be used in conjunction with the second main argument against pluralism to push the
pluralist to further extremes.
So the pluralist must reject (8*). How?
Well, one thing that the pluralist can say is that (8*), like (8), is false because
something is a statue – an artwork – in virtue partly of its relational properties (Baker
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1997). But it is obviously false that if x is an F in virtue partly of its relational
properties and y is intrinsically microphysically like x and does not merely partly
overlap x then y is an F.
This is correct. (8*) and (8) are obviously false, as Johnston notes, since
whether something is a statue depends on its causal origin, at least. But since it is part
of the story that Goliath and Lumpl have the same origin and all the same relational
properties (expressible in microphysical terms) there is no (non-question-begging)
response here for the pluralist.3
The second way the pluralist can resist accepting (8*) is by insisting that sortal
concepts are constituted by persistence conditions which give necessary conditions of
falling under them and that, in the case of the concept of a statue, one such persistence
condition is: being incapable of being radically changed in shape. So Lumpl is not a
statue and (8*) is false because Lumpl is capable of being rolled into a ball and not
destroyed and no statue is. Later I will be arguing that it is not necessary to assume
that sortal concepts involve de re persistence conditions of this type in order to
distinguish them from non-sortal concepts and what is acceptable in the thought that
they do can be made consistent with moderate monism. But for now all I want to
emphasise is that if it is said that Lumpl is a piece of bronze and not a statue because
it is capable of being rolled into a ball without being destroyed it cannot also be said
3 In fact, Baker’s own objection to the argument as actually given in Noonan 1993
appears to be rather that Lumpl, although a statue, is so derivatively, and so is not a
distinct statue from Goliath (Baker 1997:604). If I understand this it involves
accepting what I said earlier no pluralist could accept, that though Goliath and Lumpl
are both statues and distinct (i.e., non-identical) objects, they are not distinct statues,
but the same statue. But since Baker denies that Lumpl is non-derivatively a statue she
faces the same problems in explaining why that the standard pluralist does in
explaining why Lumpl is not a statue at all. Why are (8*) and (8*’) false, except for
reasons that have no bearing on the argument against the pluralist, when ‘statue’ is
read as ‘non-derivative statue’?
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that it is capable of being rolled into a ball and not destroyed because it is piece of
bronze and not a statue. The pluralist who appeals to modal differences to explain
why Goliath and Lumpl are of different sorts cannot say that their modal differences
are explicable in terms of their different sorts.
The final possibility for the pluralist who wishes to reject (8*) then is just to
say that the sortal difference between Goliath and Lumpl is primitive. There is no
other difference between them that explains why Goliath is a statue and Lumpl not,
although there are other differences between them consequential on this difference,
like the modal difference just noted, and other differences are possible because of this
difference (it may be that the statue is admired and the piece of bronze not, that the
statue is valuable and the piece of bronze not etc. (Fine 2003)). Not every difference
between things can be grounded in some other difference, one must stop somewhere
and in this case that is here. Against this position I have nothing to say, except that it
seems surprising. It is plausible that the question ‘In virtue of what is this object
(which is in fact an electron) negatively charged?’ may have no answer, but it does
not seem plausible that the question ‘In virtue of what is this object (which is in fact a
statue) a statue?’ should be similarly unanswerable.
At any rate, to reject the first argument against pluralism the pluralist must
deny (8*) and to do so relevantly he must either accept that purely material entities of
identical material constitution at all times can be distinct merely in virtue of
differences in modal, dispositional or counterfactual properties or that purely material
entities of identical material constitution at all times can be distinct merely in virtue of
differences in sortal properties.
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The second argument against pluralism that I find impressive is that it entails a
degree of ontological inflation far greater than that made evident by the case of
Goliath and Lumpl.
One way of arguing this is to consider the extensions of a compositionally vague
general term on the assumption that vagueness has its source in language, not the
world (see Noonan 1993, drawing on Hughes 1986). But a simpler way to argue the
point is to start with the thought that we employ a particular set of artefact concepts,
but could have employed a slightly different set. Thus we talk, for example, of
‘snowballs’, where what is required for the persistence of a snowball is the persistence
of a roughly spherical lump of snow. A snowball is destroyed once the lump is
flattened into a disc shape.
Clearly, however, we could talk of ‘snowdiscballs’, where what is required for
the persistence of a snowdiscball is less demanding; merely that the lump of snow
remains either in a ball shape or a disc shape (see Sosa 1987). The concept of a
snowdiscball is as legitimate as the concept of a snowball and, in fact, in many cases
where a snowball is present there will also be present an all-times-coincident
snowdiscball (in every case, that is, in which the snowball is not made from a
previously disc shaped piece of snow or destroyed by flattening it into a disc shape).
But to hold, in such a situation, that two, at-all-times-coincident, entities are present
seems clearly absurd. It cannot be justified by insisting on the systematic reasons for
distinguishing pieces of matter from the objects which constitute them, which
Johnston gives as reasons for preferring his (8’) and (9’) to (8) and (9).4 And, again, if
4 The point that the pluralist is committed to distinct but at all times coincident
artefacts can be made without appeal to the manufactured concept of a snowdiscball.
Consider the familiar concepts of a house and a room. Suppose I build a one-roomed
house, with the intention of extending it later, but never do. Then the house and the
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we accept that in such a situation there are two coincident entities, we are bound to
accept many more, for, once one gets the idea, it is very easy to invent other variations
on the concept of a snowdiscball. So the point obviously generalizes to other artefact
concepts and there seems no reason to reject its generalization to all concepts but an
unacceptable anthropocentrism.
The position, then, is that if we insist on the standard, non-Abelardian, account
of modal predication, which underpins the usual Leibniz’s Law argument for
pluralism, it will not be enough to allow that there is a systematic distinction between
pieces of matter and the material objects they constitute; we will also have to accept
that within the category of material objects constituted by pieces of matter it is
possible for two distinct material objects to be at all times coincident, and in fact we
will have to accept that not only can this be the case, but it is always the case—
whenever we are prone to speak of there being one material object of a certain sort,
there are, in fact, very many, always coincident, material objects of similar sorts
distinguished only by their modal, dispositional or counterfactual properties.
Moreover, these entities will not merely be of similar sorts (snowballs and
snowdiscballs) but of the same sort unless the doubly weakened version of (8),
namely (8*’) and its equivalents for other concepts are all relevantly false. I submit
that accepting all this is too high a price to pay just to preserve the standard account of
modal predication. Yet once we reject that account we no longer have any good
room are permanently coincident. But the house could have been enlarged into (or
originally built as) a many-roomed mansion, in which case the room would have
become (or always have been) a proper part of it. So the pluralist must distinguish the
two (see further the discussion of the paradox of increase below, or consider Lewis’s
example of GWR and GWR- (1986) or Kripke’s example of the rootless plant and its
stem in his unpublished lectures on identity). What the example of the snowdiscball
brings out in addition is merely how huge the pluralist’s ontological commitment is.
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argument for non-identity even in the case of Goliath and Lumpl; we can, therefore,
embrace monism without qualms.
The pluralist can respond (Mackie unpublished) that whilst this argument does
establish that pluralism entails a degree of ontological inflation far greater than initial
reflection on the case of Goliath and Lumpl might suggest, this is not unacceptably
high, or at least, if it is the typical moderate monist, with his perdurantist commitment
to plenitude, is in no position to say so. The only difference between the typical
monist and the pluralist, in fact, is that whilst the moderate monist must accept the
existence of snowdiscballs as well as snowballs just as the pluralist must, the latter
must also accept, what the former will not, that there are snowdiscballs that are
permanently coincident with distinct snowballs. This is a difference indeed, but why
the pluralist can say, is it a significant one? Why, once the existence of snowdiscballs
is conceded is it a significant gain in ontological economy to claim that when such
entities are permanently coincident with snowballs they are identical with them?
I have no conclusive reply to this response. However, it is worth considering
the consequence of accepting pluralism for the description of a possible world
containing just one, spatially unextended, durationless atom (and it is hard to see why
pluralists should consider such a thought experiment illegitimate). The moderate
monist will say that this world contains just one material object. The pluralist must
allow that it may contain a multitude, distinguished only by their sortal differences
and modal differences. In fact, it is hard to see how the pluralist can avoid saying that
such a world must contain infinitely many numerically distinct material objects. I
leave it to the reader to decide whether this ontological commitment is not
significantly more extensive than that of the plenitudinous perdurantist.
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III
I turn now to the arguments against moderate monism and begin with Jim Stone’s
(2005a, 2005c).
Stone argues that moderate monism is incoherent, employing an argument that
Penelope Mackie (2007) has dubbed the ‘modal dilemma’. His argument is that if the
moderate monist accepts, as he must, the Abelardian account of modal predication he
has a problem explaining why in the same origin, temporary coincidence scenario
(Scenario II) the up-to time-t10-coincident statue and piece of bronze then go their
separate ways.
It is natural to respond to this demand for explanation by appealing to a modal
difference between the two: the statue does not survive radical reshaping (say, into a
mermaid shape) because it cannot, whereas the piece of bronze can. Or, as Mackie
(2007) puts it, it is natural to respond to the explanatory demand by appealing to the
fact that in Scenario II:
(M3) The statue can survive being transformed into mermaid shape
is false, although
(M4) The piece of bronze can survive being transformed into mermaid shape
is true.
But if modal predication is Abelardian this apparent difference need not
correspond to any genuine difference between the statue and the piece of bronze,
since this difference in truth-value is compatible with the statue being the piece of
bronze (as in Scenario I). But then it looks as if the mere fact that (M3) and (M4)
differ in truth-value cannot explain why in Scenario II the statue and the piece of
bronze go their separate ways.
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Thus, it appears, the moderate monist faces what Mackie calls a modal
dilemma. To account for the identity verdict in Scenario I he must accept that modal
predication is Abelardian, but to endorse the intuition that the apparent modal
difference between the up-to-t10-coincident statue and piece of bronze in Scenario II
is explanatory of their future divergence he must regard this difference as a genuine
one – which seems to require rejecting Abelardianism.
To see how the moderate monist can explain why the statue and the
piece of bronze go their separate ways in Scenario II note first that, irrespective of
one’s view of modal predication, the fact that (M3) is false and (M4) is true in
Scenario II cannot explain why the statue and the piece of bronze in fact go their
separate ways, since although the fact that (M3) is false entails that the statue does not
in fact survive reshaping, the fact that (M4) is true does not entail that the piece of
bronze in fact does survive reshaping – since what can happen may or may not in fact
happen.
The explanation of the divergence of that statue and the piece of bronze in
Scenario II that the moderate monist can offer goes like this:
(1) The statue is a statue
(2) No statue can survive radical reshaping
So:
(3) No statue does survive radical reshaping
So:
(4) The statue does not survive radical reshaping.
But:
(5) Necessarily, any piece of bronze survives radical reshaping in which all its
matter is preserved in one coherent whole
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(6) The matter of the piece of bronze is radically reshaped but preserved in
one coherent whole.
So:
(7) The piece of bronze survives radical reshaping.
Therefore:
(8) The statue and the piece of bronze go their separate ways.
In this explanation (2) and (5) are de dicto modal propositions which tell us something
about the persistence conditions, or identity criteria, of statues and pieces of bronze.
(1) and (6) are non-modal claims about what actually happens. The proposition that
the statue is not a piece of bronze (but see section IV below) is, of course, entailed by
this explanation, but it does not have an explanatory role.
The obvious worry about this explanation is that it does not do sufficient
justice to the intuition that the SII statue does not survive reshaping because it cannot.
The principle appealed to, to justify the claim that the statue cannot survive radical
reshaping, is the de dicto modal principle, (2), that no statue can survive radical
reshaping, that is, that necessarily, if something is a statue it does not survive radical
reshaping. But we can introduce the predicate ‘permanent bachelor’ with the obvious
meaning and then there will be a de dicto modal principle analogous to (2) to the
effect that no permanent bachelor can survive marriage. But it would be absurd to
appeal to such a principle to explain why Dick, who, it turns out on his deathbed, was
a permanent bachelor, never married when the opportunity presented itself.
Analogously, then, why is it not absurd to explain the divergence of the statue and the
piece of bronze in Scenario II by appeal to the de dicto modal propositions (2) and
(5)?
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However, the explanation is straightforward. Scenario II is given to us by its
description, as one in which a statue is coincident-up-to-t10 with a piece of bronze.
The statue is not identifiable in any other way than as a statue (or as something which
differs in its future after t10 from the piece of bronze) – it is not identifiable, for
example, as the statue-like thing indiscernible from the piece of bronze up to t10,
since that description is also true of the piece of bronze. By contrast, any situation one
describes in which there is a permanent bachelor is one in which the man in question
is identifiable in some other way (as ‘Mary’s eldest brother’, for example), so the
question ‘Why did that man, who in fact never married (Mary’s eldest brother), fail to
marry when he had the opportunity?’ can be formulated.5 No such question can be
formulated about the thing that is in fact a statue in Scenario II.
I conclude that explaining why the statue and the piece of bronze in the same-
origin-temporary-coincidence scenario go their separate ways is no problem for the
moderate monist. To do so he needs merely to appeal to factual claims and to de dicto
modal propositions, so his distinctive Abelardian account of de re modal predication
is not at issue.
This response to Stone’s modal dilemma serves equally as a response to the
‘paradox of increase’ recently put forward by Eric Olson (2006) as a puzzle that any
account of material objects must confront, and which presents any account at all in
accord with common sense with a serious challenge. In fact, the possibility of increase
is unproblematic for the moderate monist.
5 As Mackie pointed out to me, this difference is related to the following fact about
permanent bachelors: when a man marries, no permanent bachelor goes out of
existence, and the ‘coincidence’ between a permanent bachelor and a man (unlike the
coincidence between a statue and a piece of bronze) can never be merely temporary.
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Objects with the same origin can cease to be coincident in two ways: one can
continue to exist when the other ceases (as in the case of Goliath and Lumpl), or one
or both can come to have a part the other lacks. When one of two coincident objects
gains a part and the other does not, therefore, we merely have another example of a
type of same-origin-temporary-coincidence scenario and we can anticipate that any
apparent paradox can be disarmed by appeal to the same considerations that disarmed
Stone’s modal dilemma.
We can see how this plays out if we examine Olson’s presentation of the
paradox of increase more closely. He sets it out in entirely general terms, but it helps
in thinking it through to have a concrete example in mind, so in what follows think of
A as a house, B as a room which is added to the house after the initial construction
and C as the original structure before B is added (or consider Kripke’s example in his
lectures on identity (unpublished) of the rootless plant consisting only of a stem until
it grows a flower as a part). Here then is Olson’s presentation of the paradox of
increase:
Suppose we have an object A and we want to make it bigger by adding a part
B. Let us therefore conjoin B to A in some appropriate way. Never mind what
this conjoining amounts to: let us do whatever it would take to make B a part
of A if it ever can be. Have we thereby made B a part of A? It seems not. We
have only brought it about that B is attached to A. We have rearranged A’s
surroundings by giving it a new neighbour, but we haven’t given it a new part.
If we have made A a part of anything, we have made it a part of the thing
made of A and B after our conjoining. But that thing didn’t exist at all when
we started … or if it did, it already had B as a part…. It seems that nothing
would ever give A a new part.
20
Olson goes on to state this reasoning in a way that makes its premisses explicit
and lays out a range of possible solutions. Thus stated the reasoning has eight steps:
(1) A acquires B as a part
(2) When A acquires B as a part, it comes to be composed of B and C (= the
rest of A apart from B)
(3) C does not acquire B as a part
(4) C exists before B is attached
(5) C coincides mereologically with A before B is attached
(6) No two things can coincide mereologically at a time
So:
(7) C=A
So:
(8) A does not acquire B as a part (from (3) and (7))
– contradicting the original assumption (1).
One way of resisting this argument, of course, is to deny (7). This is what the
moderate monist does, he says that before A acquires a new part it coincides with but
is distinct from C, which ends up as a part of A. Olson responds:
But if A got bigger why didn’t C get bigger too? … A but not C has the
capacity to grow by gaining B as a part…. This is surprising. A and C appear
to be exactly alike before the attachment…. There appears to be no difference
that could account for any differing capacity to acquire parts…. We might try
to explain it in terms of a difference in kind. A can acquire new parts because
it is a [house] … a thing of some ‘mereologically inconstant’ kind, C cannot
change its parts because it is not…. But this is little help…. What is it about A
that makes it a [house]? Ordinarily we expect there to be a physical difference
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between [houses] and other things…. But there is no such difference between
A and C. It looks as if what makes A a [house] is nothing more than what sort
of thing it can survive … it is a [house] because, in addition to having all the
right physical properties (which C shares), it can also gain new parts…. It
looks like coincidentalists [i.e., moderate monists] will have to say that there is
no explanation of why A but not C can gain new parts…. A’s capacity and C’s
incapacity to gain new parts are basic properties of them … we cannot explain
their having them in terms of other properties, in the way we can explain why
an object is fragile in terms of the way its particles are bonded together.
These considerations are evidently the same as those lying behind Stone’s
modal dilemma and the response is the same. A house can be made bigger by
appropriate building work just as a piece of bronze can be radically reshaped. There is
a de dicto modal principle that specifies part of the persistence conditions for houses
analogous to the de dicto principle, (5), employed in the explanation of the divergence
of the statue and the piece of bronze at t10 in Scenario II. A room cannot be made
bigger by the sort of building work in question. Again this is merely a de dicto modal
principle, analogous to the de dicto modal principle, (2), about statues, so there is no
more a puzzle about how the house grows though the room does not than there is
about how the piece of bronze undergoes radical reshaping though the statue does not.
And surely this is exactly what we should expect. If someone ask ‘Why was
Goliath destroyed at t10?’, a sensible answer would be, for example, ‘It was beaten
shapeless with a hammer?’ (Or maybe this is better as an answer to the question
‘How?’; an appropriate answer to the ‘Why?’ question might then be: ‘Because its
owner wanted to reuse the bronze to make a different statue.’) But if the response now
is, ‘I know that, but why did beating it shapeless with a hammer destroy it?’ the only
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appropriate reply is to say that doing that sort of thing to a statue is just what we call
destroying it. Similarly, if someone asks why C was not enlarged when A was
extended a sensible reply would be to point to the sort of building work done, which
did not constitute what we call ‘enlarging a room’ If the response is now ‘I now that
work was done, but why was carrying it out not enlarging the room (though it did
constitute extending the house)?’ the only appropriate reply to is repeat that doing that
sort of building work is just what we call ‘extending a house’ and do not call
‘enlarging a room’. Given that C is a room, therefore, there is no more mystery about
why it is not extended though A is than about why Goliath is destroyed when the
bronze is hammered shapeless.
The de dicto modal principles employed in these explanations can be thought
of, as I have said, as specifying persistence conditions for things of the sorts in
question, or again, they may be thought of as specifying criteria of identity for things
of these sorts. Staying with the example of statues and pieces of bronze, we have seen
two types of persistence conditions in the discussion above.
The principle that no statue can undergo radical reshaping can be expressed as follows
(S) Necessarily, for all x, if x is a statue then if the matter that constitutes x at t
is radically reshaped at t, then x ceases to exist
– this specifies a ‘passing away’ condition for statues.
The principle that any piece of bronze must survive radical reshaping in which all its
matter is preserved in one coherent whole can be expressed as:
(P) Necessarily, for all x, if x is a piece of bronze then if the matter that
constitutes x at t is radically reshaped at t but preserved in one coherent mass,
x survives
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– a ‘preservation’ condition for pieces of bronze (this terminology comes from
Mackie (unpublished b)).
Both ‘passing away’ and ‘preservation conditions’ can, however, be thought of
as consequences of conditions of a more fundamental kind. The reason why sortal
concepts are governed by such conditions is that they constrain the histories of the
things they apply to, and such constraints can always be expressed in the form:
Necessarily, if x is an S then if x exists at t and t’ then Rxtt’.
Or of the form:
Necessarily, if x is an S then if Rxtt’ x exists at t and t’.
Thus the ‘passing-away’ condition for statues is entailed by a principle of the first
form (stating that a statue cannot have radically different shapes at different times)
and the ‘preservation condition’ for pieces of bronze is entailed by a principle of the
second form (stating that if the matter composing a piece of bronze is in one coherent
mass at both of two times, whatever shape it is in, the piece of bronze exists at both
times).
Principles of these forms lay down necessary conditions for being a thing of
sort S and a specification of the totality of such conditions is a specification of the
persistence conditions, or the criterion of diachronic identity, for things of that sort.
What distinguishes sortal concepts from non-sortal concepts (even ones that
necessarily apply to a thing at any time it exists, like being a permanent bachelor) is
that they are governed by such de dicto modal principles.
It follows that questions about criteria of identity over time are misunderstood
if they are thought of as questions about identity. Rather they are questions about the
conditions of membership of sortal kinds. The problem of statue identity over time,
for example, can be formulated as follows, without mention of identity:
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(Q) What conditions C satisfy the following schema: (SC) If x is a statue then
if x exists at t and t*, Cxtt*?
A solution to the problem, i.e., an account of statue identity over time, will then take
the following form:
(A) All and only the following conditions satisfy schema (SC): [LIST].
To see that this is an adequate rephrasing of the problem one need only observe that a
condition is sufficient just in case nothing else is necessary. So a complete list of
necessary conditions, together with the fact that the list is complete determines all the
sufficient conditions. But a quaternary relation R, satisfied by ordered quadruples <x,
t, y, t’> is sufficient for the identity of statue x at time t with statue y at time t’ just in
case there is no such relation R’, not entailed by R, which is a necessary condition of
statue identity over time (where to say that R’ is a necessary condition of statue
identity over time is just to say, as we have seen, that if x is a statue and x exists at t
and t* then R’xtxt*).
Question (Q) then expresses, without mention of identity, everything that
could possibly be wanted in enquiry after the conditions of statue identity over time –
and the same holds, mutatis mutandis, of course, for all questions about criteria of
identity over time. (Of course, questions about criteria of identity at a time are
subsumed under question (Q). Conditions listed under (A) will include ones of the
form: ‘if t=t* then Rxt’.)
IV
I claim, then, that the moderate monist can answer the objections of Stone and Olson.
Now I turn to Mackie’s objection (Mackie unpublished a).
This can be approached by noting that if the response to Stone and Olson
given above is accepted it must be taken on board that whether a sortal concept
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applies to a thing depends on its total history, past, present and future. But Mackie
objects that this is utterly implausible. Whether something is a statue, for example, at
a time plausibly depends on its past, but it cannot depend on its future. The concept of
a statue is not future-reflecting, like the concept of a future President, say, which
applies to someone at a time in virtue of facts rooted outside that time. But, then, she
argues, moderate monism must be incorrect. Since Lumpl is distinct from Goliath in
the same-origin-temporary-coincidence scenario it is not a statue, even before
Goliath’s demise (there are not two statues there). So, since the same-origin-
permanent coincidence differs only with respect to future events, Lumpl is not a statue
there either. But Goliath is. So they are two, not one. Pluralism is vindicated.
Mackie also appeals to the contention that sortal concepts are not future-
reflecting to challenge the first of the arguments given in Section II above against
pluralism. The argument was based on the plausibility of the following sufficient
condition for being a statue:
(8*) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y and x
does not merely partly overlap any statue, then x is a statue.
But Mackie argues that since sortal concepts are not future reflecting (8*) is no more
plausible than:
(8*B) If y is a paradigm statue and y begins to exist at t and x begins to exist at
t and x is microphysically exactly like y from t up to some later time t’ and x
does not merely partly overlap any statue from t to t’, then x is a statue.
But she says, moderate monists must reject (8*B), on pain of making the statue and
piece of bronze identical in the same-origin-temporary-coincidence scenario. So the
moderate monist’s appeal to (8*) is undermined.
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One way the moderate monist can respond to all this is by querying the claim
that sortal concepts are not future-reflecting. He can agree that I do not need foresight
to know that there is a statue before me, and that I can know of what is before me that
it coincides with a statue without knowing its future – and so he can agree that in
these respects the concept of a statue is unlike the concept of a future President –
whilst insisting that in the strict sense Mackie’s argument requires not to be the case,
sortal concepts are future-reflecting. But I think it is more straightforward for the
moderate monist to allow that sortal concepts are not future-reflecting, even in the
strict sense.
What follows?
First, it follows that whether we are in the permanent-coincidence or
temporary-coincidence scenario, Lumpl is a statue before t10. So in the temporary-
coincidence scenario there are two objects present before t10 each of which is a statue
then. Are there two statues there? Not unless we count by identity. So the moderate
monist can simply deny that we do. In other words the moderate monist can simply
take a leaf out of the relative identity theorist’s book.6 Entities are to be counted as
two statues, he can say, when both are statues and are not the same statue. But though
when coincident Goliath and Lumpl are both statues they are then the same statue, so
they are to be counted as one statue. They are the same statue because the relation we
express in English with the form of words ‘is the same statue as at time t’ is a relative
equivalence relation, not an absolute equivalence relation.
6 I am not endorsing every component of the relative identity theorist’s position here.
In particular, I am not endorsing Geach’s argument for the inexpressibility in any
language of absolute identity. See Noonan 1997 for an overall assessment of relative
identity.
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In fact, we can now see that the same-origin-temporary-coincidence scenario
is just an example of precisely the type of situation to which relative identity theorists
typically appeal in support of their position.
Consider Geach’s unlucky cat, Tibbles, and its tail complement, Tib.7 Tibbles
is sitting comfortably on the mat. And Tib is there too, occupying a smaller region.
Some relative identity theorists (and others, for example, Chisholm 1986) are
prepared to argue as follows: ‘there is one cat on the mat. Tib is on the mat. Tibbles is
on the mat. Tib is a cat. Tibbles is a cat. So Tibbles is (one and) the same cat as Tib.
But Tib is not (identical with) Tibbles (it is smaller). So objects can be the same cat
without being numerically identical. Being the same cat as at a time is a relative
identity relation.’
But there is an easy response to this argument, namely that the concept of a cat
is maximal, no cat is a proper part of a cat.
The relative identity theorist can avoid this response by extending the story by
supposing that Tibbles’ tail cut off. After the amputation Tib is wholly coincident
with Tibbles, so that appeal to the maximality requirement on the concept of a cat
fails. But the relative identity theorist’s opponent can plausibly say that Tib is not a
cat even after the amputation, because it has the wrong past history.
But the relative identity theorist can avoid this rejoinder by suggesting a time-
reversed variant of the case of Tib and Tibbles, in which we begin with a tailless cat
7 What is Tib? Tib is a certain bodily part of a cat, like a tail, leg, whisker or head. We
can run the Tib/Tibbles arguments taking Tib to be a cat’s head, in fact. (Animals
have been decapitated in experiments and their heads kept alive, though the subjects
of these experiments were not cats but, as Tibbles would be pleased to know, dogs. In
C.S. Lewis’s novel, That Hideous Strength, the leader of the wicked organization
Ransom, the hero, fights is always referred to, as it turns out, significantly, as ‘The
Head’)
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and graft on a tail – in other words a same-origin-temporary-coincidence case of the
same type as the Goliath/Lumpl example, or Olson’s example of (house) A and
(room) C. Now the opponent of relative identity faces a hard set of choices. He can
deny that both Tib and Tibbles exist before the grafting. Or he can accept that the
concept of a cat is future-reflecting. Or he can join the pluralist in denying that there
need be any actual microphysical difference, relational or non-relational, past, present
or future between a cat and something which is not a cat – which takes us back over
old ground.
It is not surprising then that the moderate monist’s position, when developed
in the most straightforward way to meet Mackie’s objection, leads to an acceptance of
relative identity.8
But Mackie’s object can be pressed further. I have claimed that the moderate
monist should say that Goliath and Lumpl are the same statue before t10 in the
temporary coincidence scenario. But we can speak, and I have been speaking, of the
statue in the scenario, and the (statue shaped and sized) piece of bronze. How are
these definite descriptions to be understood?
At this point the moderate monist must take another leaf out of the relative
identity theorist’s book, and distinguish between restricted sortal quantification and
unrestricted quantification over things falling under a sortal concept. The de dicto
persistence conditions governing the concept of a statue define a sortal kind to which
Goliath but not Lumpl belongs (in the temporary coincidence scenario; in the
8 The pluralist need not reject this reasoning. In fact, extant pluralists should welcome
it. From their point of view, to say that moderate monists should accept relative
identity is just to say that a position they reject entails another position they reject.
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permanent coincidence scenario both belong to it because ‘they’ are the same object).
It is this sort we quantify over when we use the quantifying expressions ‘some statue’
and ‘every statue’ (mutatis mutandis, ‘some piece of bronze’ and ‘every piece of
bronze’). And it is these quantifying expressions that figure in the appropriate
Russellian expansion of the definite descriptions mentioned above. So the description
‘the statue in such and such a place at t5’ uniquely denotes Goliath even though
Lumpl is there and is also, before t10 a statue.
As I said, the distinction between restricted sortal quantification and
unrestricted quantification over things falling under a sortal concept, is a familiar part
of the relative identity theorist’s package, but in a moment I want to show how it
naturally emerges in another framework, namely, that of the stage-theorist. Before
coming to that, however, I want first to explain how it is a necessary part of the
moderate monist’s position even if relative identity is rejected.
Return to the permanent coincidence scenario. The moderate monist says that
in this situation Goliath is Lumpl. So he has to accept that modal predication is
Abelardian. So he is able to deny that Lumpl would be destroyed if rolled into a ball
whilst acknowledging that Goliath would be destroyed if rolled into a ball. Can he
also endorse the universally quantified proposition that any statue would be destroyed
if rolled into a ball (with the exception of statues, say statues of Humpty Dumpty, we
better add to be strict, originally created to be ball shaped)?
An argument that he cannot goes as follows. According to the moderate
monist Lumpl is Goliath in the permanent coincidence situation. So it is a statue. So if
the moderate monist accepts that anything that is a statue would be destroyed if rolled
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into a ball he must accept that Lumpl would be destroyed if rolled into a ball. But he
doesn’t. So he must deny that anything that is a statue would be destroyed if rolled
into a ball. So he must deny that any statue would be destroyed if rolled into a ball.
The only response available to the moderate monist, if he wishes to endorse
the commonsensical proposition that any statue would be destroyed if rolled into a
ball, is to distinguish this from the stronger proposition that anything that is a statue
would be destroyed if rolled into a ball. But this is to distinguish (where ‘S’ is a sortal
term) between a proposition of the form ‘Every S is …’ and one of the form
‘Everything, if it is an S is …’ (where ‘…’ represents a modal or dispositional
predicate), which is precisely to distinguish restricted sortal quantification from
unrestricted quantification over things that satisfy a sortal concept. (The need for this
distinction for the moderate monist is implicitly noted by Lewis in his paper
‘Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies’, where he points out that on his account of
modal predication, even if everybody (i.e., every person) is his body and conversely,
every body is a person, ‘Everybody might have been a disembodied spirit’ does not
have the same truth-conditions as ‘Every body might have been a disembodied spirit’;
consequently the former cannot be equivalent to ‘Everything, if it is a person, might
have been a disembodied spirit’, nor the latter to ‘Everything, if it is a body, might
have been a disembodied spirit’.)
Now I need to tie up some loose ends. I agreed with Mackie that sortal
concepts are not future-reflecting, but now we can see that there is a sense in which
they are. Lumpl is a statue before t10 in the temporary-coincidence scenario, but it
does not fall within the range of the quantifying expressions ‘some statue’ and ‘every
statue’ that must be used in the appropriate Russellian account of the uniquely
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denoting definite description ‘the statue in such and such a place before t10’. So
Lump does not fall under the predicate ‘is identical with some statue’, when ‘is
identical with’ denotes numerical identity and ‘some statue’ is the first of these
quantifying expressions. So this predicate is future-reflecting. In a sense then, I have
responded to Mackie merely by moving the bump under the carpet, but I hope the
intuitive plausibility of the position is still evident.
I come now to the second loose end. Evidently, with the distinction now made,
I cannot endorse the de dicto modal principles employed previously in responding to
Stone and Olson, but the acceptable modal principles are the ones got by replacing, in
(S) and (P), the quantifying expressions ‘for every x, if x is a statue …’ and ‘for every
x, if x is a piece of bronze …’ by ‘for every statue x’ and ‘for every piece of bronze
x’, understood as explained above. (Similarly, in the formulation, (Q), of the problem
of statue identity over time, the clause ‘if x is a statue then’ in (SC) must be replaced
by ‘for every statue x,’.)
Note also that within the present framework, as well as these de dicto modal
principles, the moderate monist can also endorse a set of de re modal principles which
are plausibly partly constitutive of our grasp of sortal concepts, such as:
Any statue would be destroyed if rolled into a ball
Any piece of bronze would survive if rolled into a ball.
The moderate monist can also endorse the following stronger principles, which are,
however, ones that anti-essentialists, like Mackie (see Mackie 2006 and unpublished
b), would reject (though Lewisean anti-essentialists would accept):
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No statue could survive if rolled into a ball
Any piece of bronze must survive if rolled into a ball.
Finally, I want to explain how the present development of moderate monism
can be seen as a plausible modification of stage theory if a four-dimensional ontology
is assumed.
Recall first the distinction between standard perdurance theory and stage
theory. For perdurance theorists statues and pieces of bronze are summations of
stages, which may share parts. A statue is a maximal summation of stages linked by
the statue unity relation. A piece of bronze is a maximal summation of stages linked
by the piece of bronze unity relation. So whether something is a statue does depend on
its future as well as on its past and present, since Goliath is a statue and Lumpl is not a
statue, not because of any actual past or present differences, or because of any modal
or dispositional differences, but merely because of future differences. (Mutatis
mutandis the room I am now typing in and the house I am now typing in are distinct
and the former is not a house and the latter is a house, not because of any way they
differ here, but because the house extends beyond the (internal) door and the room
does not.) It follows that it no more makes sense to ask when something is a statue
than it makes sense to ask where something is a house (by contrast it makes sense to
ask when something is bent and where it is infested with woodworm). Sortal concepts
are not time-indexed for the perdurantist (they do not express relations to times).
The stage theorist maintains, in opposition to the perdurantist, that statues and
pieces of bronze are not maximal summations of stages linked by unity relations, but
are themselves stages. Statues are stages, which is to say, (some) stages are statues. So
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at any time at which a statue and a piece of bronze coincide there is a genuine
numerical identity between something that is a statue and something that is a piece of
bronze: something is both a statue and a piece of bronze. An advantage that the stage
theorist claims for his account is that it provides the right bearers for Lewis’s
temporary intrinsics. If I bend the statue and first straighten it out (let’s suppose that
this much distortion is consistent with the artist’s creative intentions so that we can
stay with the familiar example) then, Lewis says, there has to be something that is
bent simpliciter and something that is straight simpliciter. But the endurantist, who
rejects plenitude, cannot recognise such an object; he just recognises the enduring
statue, which stands in the bent at relation to one time and the straight at relation to
another. This, Lewis claims, is an argument for perdurantism. But if so, the stage
theorist claims, it is an even better argument for stage theory, since he can capture, as
the perdurantist cannot, the intuition that the thing that is bent simpliciter is a statue.
The stage theorist will therefore be happy to say that at every moment before t10 in
the temporary coincidence scenario the piece of bronze is a statue and the statue is a
piece of bronze, since every one of the coincident stages before t10 is both a statue
and a piece of bronze.
One problem for the stage theorist is to explain why I have only ever owned
three cats, given that I have owned an infinite number of cat stages (of course, he also
faces the problem of explaining why I have owned more than one cat given that ‘I’
denotes a present instantaneous stage, but, as is familiar, he solves this problem by
appeal to an Abelardian temporal counterpart theory). One plausible line suggested by
Hawley’s discussion (2001:62) is to say that when counting cats we do not count by
numerical identity, but by the cat unity relation, i.e., that relation which holds between
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two cat stages (cats) when, as the perdurantist would say, they are stages of the same
cat. But since cat stages are cats, it is plausible to suppose that we count them as the
same only when they are the same cat; in which case we must take it that ‘is the same
cat as’ denotes, not numerical identity, but the cat unity relation (which, however,
holds between simultaneous cat stages only when they are numerically identical –
setting aside time-travelling cats). Another way of responding to the problem of
counting across time, suggested by Sider’s discussion (2001:197), is to say that
sometimes, when we quantify over cats, we quantify not over cat stages (though they
are cats), but over maximal summations of cat stages related pairwise by the cat unity
relation. Understanding my assertion that I have only ever owned three cats in terms
of such quantification gets the truth-conditions right.
It is reasonable, I think, to say that we should not regard these suggestions by
Hawley and Sider as in competition; rather they are complementary. Stage theorists
need both. They need to recognise quantification over summations as well as stages
because they need to account for the function of such definite descriptions as ‘the cat I
owned in 2001 and 2005’ (I owned two cats in 2001, one died, and I got another,
which, along with the remaining cat, I still owned in 2005). And stage theorists need
to recognise that ‘is the same cat as’ denotes the unity relation for cats, rather than
numerical identity, in order to avoid the implausibility of saying that though you have
only ever owned one cat, you have owned infinitely many things, each of which was a
cat and no two of which were the same cat.
At any rate, it is easy to see how the moderate monist can employ the stage
theorist’s ideas, modified in the way suggested, if he accepts the plenitudinous
ontology common to the perdurantist and stage theorist. His account will still be
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distinct from that of the extreme monist (we can describe it as moderately extreme
monism), since, though he will recognise a strict identity at any moment before t10 in
the temporary coincidence scenario between something which is correctly describable
as a statue and something which is correctly describable as a piece of bronze, he will
be able to deny that the statue is identical with the piece of bronze. And, of course, the
arguments against pluralism and the responses to the objections to moderate monism
put forward by Stone, Olson and Mackie will remain in force.
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